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ABSTRACT 
 
Property Rights and Gender Bias: 
Evidence from Land Reform in West Bengal* 
 
While land reforms are typically pursued in order to raise productivity and reduce inequality 
across households, an unintended consequence may be increased within-household gender 
inequality. We analyse a tenancy registration programme in West Bengal, and find that it 
increased child survival and reduced fertility. However, we also find that it intensified son 
preference in families without a first-born son to inherit the land title. These families exhibit no 
reduction in fertility, an increase in the probability that a subsequent birth is male, and a 
substantial increase in the survival advantage of subsequent sons over daughters. 
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1.  Introduction 
Secure property rights are considered a cornerstone of  economic development. Land 
rights are particularly important in developing countries where large fractions of  the population 
are dependent upon agriculture. During 1955-2000 a billion people and nearly as many hectares 
were affected by land reform (Lipton, 2009). Previous research demonstrates the importance of  
land security in increasing agricultural productivity, facilitating access to credit, and reducing 
poverty and cross-household asset inequality (Besley & Burgess, 2000; Besley, 1995; Besley & 
Ghatak, 2010; Besley, et al., 2012; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Hornbeck, 2010). However, where land 
rights are heritable, and primarily inherited by sons, land reform may exacerbate an underlying 
preference for sons and thereby increase within-household inequality.  
While male-biased land rights have been indicated as a cause of  son preference in India 
and elsewhere, there have been few opportunities to study changes in land rights. We present what 
we think is the first attempt to analyse changes in the exercise of  son preference in response to 
changes in inter-generationally transferable (male-biased) land rights. We exploit variation in land 
rights created by Operation Barga, a flagship tenancy reform in the Indian state of  West Bengal, 
that previous research shows increased agricultural productivity and farm incomes (Banerjee, et 
al., 2002). We find a significant intensification of  gender inequality, captured by the sex ratio at age 
one among children of  second or higher order. This is only evident in households in which the 
first birth is a girl, households in which it becomes especially important to have a son (Abrevaya, 
2009; Bhalotra & Cochrane, 2010). A common pattern in patrilineal societies is that daughters take 
their bequest at marriage as dowry and marry some distance from their natal home (Guner, 1999; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1985), while sons tend to co-reside with parents, work on the land, and 
subsequently inherit it. Indeed, Botticini & Siow (2003) postulate that a rationale for the origin and 
persistence of  these arrangements is that they incentivize sons to work on the father’s land, 
contributing to wealth creation as well as old-age security. Primogeniture or the practice that the 
first son has first command over ancestral land makes the first son particularly important. Overall, 
it seems plausible that tenant farmers receiving heritable title to land intensified their desire for a 
son. We discuss competing hypotheses below but, importantly, our results are robust to 
conditioning on reform-led increases in agricultural yields, so they are unlikely to arise from income 
effects of  land reform.  
We primarily study infant mortality of  girls relative to boys as this is an established marker 
of  gender-differentiated parental investments. A vast literature documents a) that Indian girls 
receive fewer investments and b) in an environment in which under-investment and, in particular, 
under-nutrition interacts with infectious disease to create death, this leads to excess girl mortality 
3 
 
after birth (Anderson & Ray, 2010; Sen, 2003; Bhalotra, 2010; Bhalotra & Cochrane, 2010; 
Chakravarty, 2010). Given evidence of  son preference manifested by under-reporting of  female 
births or infanticide (Rose, 1999), we also model the sex ratio at birth. Together, the sex ratio at 
birth and gender-differentiated infant mortality rates produce modified sex ratios at age one. Since 
fertility may have responded to land reform and both sex ratios and infant mortality are conditional 
upon birth, we also model the decision to have another birth. 
We focus upon registration of  tenant farmers in West Bengal which endowed them with 
heritable tenurial security and capped landlord shares. The programme was initiated by a Left Front 
government elected in 1977. It is estimated that 2-3 million sharecropper tenants were registered 
(half  to two thirds of  all tenants) by the mid-1990s, after which registration (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2010). We merge data on the rollout of  the reform at the district level with the year 
and district of  birth of  children in household survey data. We test for endogeneity of  reform 
rollout using pre-reform data, and find no evidence that it was correlated with pre-trends in girl 
relative to boy mortality. Simple regressions of  the sex of  births and childhood deaths on reform 
rollout may nevertheless be vulnerable to omitted variable bias, for instance because the Left-wing 
government that instigated land reform also implemented a number of  other reforms including 
decentralizing governance to the village level, and increased subsidies for farming inputs.  
So as to generate a valid control group for the estimation, we interact reform rollout with 
an indicator for the sex of  the first-born child in the household. Previous research establishes that 
the sex of  the first-born is quasi-random (which we confirm) and that it predicts son-preferring 
behaviours (Bhalotra & Cochrane, 2010). In particular, families with a first-born son (who can 
inherit their land) are more willing to have subsequent daughters than families with a first-born 
daughter. Since our hypothesis concerns parental investments in the survival of  second and higher 
order births, we further interact with the sex of  the index child, a strategy that effectively invokes 
boys as a control group. This specification allows us to test whether land reform modified girl 
relative to boy survival in households with a first-born daughter relative to households with a first-
born son.  
Conditioning upon the main effects and the two-way interaction terms addresses some of  
the first-order identification concerns. For instance, rollout of  land reform within a village or 
district may have been correlated with the rollout of  health interventions, but if  these improved 
the disease environment similarly for boys and girls, then controlling for boy survival will account 
for this correlation. We nevertheless condition upon relevant district-year varying variables, 
district-specific linear trends, and district-year fixed effects in one specification (which involves 
village level data). As the data contain siblings, we are able to introduce mother or household fixed 
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effects in the estimation, which control for possibly endogenous selection into fertility and 
programme uptake. 
On the premise that non-Hindus in India (primarily Muslims and Christians) are, by virtue 
of  religious belief, unlikely to commit abortion or, similarly, the “silent killing” of  girls through 
neglect (Almond, et al., 2013a; Bhalotra & Cochrane, 2010), we estimate the equation separately 
for the Hindu and non-Hindu samples. We expect land reform to lead to more male-biased sex 
ratios of  surviving children primarily in the Hindu population, whereas we expect all other factors 
to operate similarly across the two groups. In this way, the non-Hindu sample acts as a further 
(quasi-) “control”. As such, any omitted variables would have to vary not only by region and year 
(the level at which rollout varies), they would also have to have different effects on boys and girls 
(and, in the mother fixed effects specification, brothers and sisters), and any such differential 
effects would have to vary with the sex of  the first born in the household, and with the religion 
of  the head.  
We use two independent sources of  data containing different measures of  tenancy reform, 
the share of  tenant farmers registered at the district level and the share of  cultivable land area 
registered at the village level.  By conducting the analysis using both, we redress the weaknesses of  
each.  Our finding that the relative survival rates of  girls deteriorated as the reform progressed is 
robust to the measure of  reform used and to the use of  alternative sources of  survey data. The 
rest of  this section elaborates our findings, their implications, and our contribution to the literature. 
Our main finding is that survival gains flowing from land reform favoured sons in Hindu 
families which had not yet had a son. In particular, in families in which the first-born was (by the 
quasi-random allocation of nature) a daughter, the infant mortality rates of second and higher 
order sons and daughters diverged as land reform progressed. We estimate that median reform 
coverage (at least 50% of tenants registered) is associated with either a 0.09 percentage point 
decrease or a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability that a girl dies within a year of birth, 
depending on whether we do or do not condition upon mother fixed effects. This contrasts with 
a 5.9 to 6 percentage point decrease in infant mortality risk among boys. These households exhibit 
no reform-led change in the probability of a subsequent birth, consistent with their continuing 
fertility to achieve a male birth. Conditional upon birth, there is a 5.5 percentage point increase in 
the probability that a birth of second or higher order is a boy. Thus, land reform appears to 
stimulate sex selection at birth and in the year after birth, leading to significantly fewer girls 
surviving to age one.  
Among families with first-born sons, land reform is associated with a significant decline in 
girl infant mortality, in fact a larger decline than among boys, and no change in the sex ratio at 
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birth for second and higher order births. These estimates suggest that even if  families in West 
Bengal have a strong preference for at least one son, conditional upon this, they have a preference 
for a balanced sex composition of  births, similar to families the world over. In first-son families 
and in all non-Hindu families land reform leads to a significant decline in the chances of  
proceeding to a third birth. We suggest that this may be explained by heritable land rights securing 
the attachment of  sons to parents in their old age, and with parents investing in quality more than 
quantity of  children.   
We sought to corroborate these results using purposively gathered data at the village level 
which contain household-level information on land holdings and more reliable data on land reform 
gathered from village registers (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2010; 2011). The identification strategy is 
broadly similar, and we are again able to condition upon household fixed effects. As the variation 
in land reform is now measured at the village level, we can also include district-year fixed effects. 
We find strikingly similar results. Tenancy reform is associated with a significant decrease in the 
chances of  a surviving girl alongside a significant increase in the chances of  a surviving boy. 
Overall, a 10% increase in the share of  cultivable village land registered significantly increases the 
probability of  observing a surviving boy by 0.06 to 0.11 percentage points while reducing the 
probability of  a surviving girl by 0.08 to 0.12 percentage points. The difference is driven by 
households with a first-born girl, where girl survival rates drop by 0.20 percentage points, and boy 
survival rates increase by 0.08 percentage points.1 In general, we see larger differences among 
immigrant and landless households, consistent with their drawing the largest benefits from tenancy 
reform. Once again, there is no evidence of  land reform creating gender bias in non-Hindu 
households.  
This paper would appear to provide the first evidence that the tendency for land 
inheritance rights to favour sons in patrilineal societies can mean that land reform may intensify 
son preference, even as it raises productivity and lowers asset inequality between households. We 
find fairly compelling evidence of  this, amounting to the elimination of  girls alongside improved 
survival of  boys in roughly half  of  the Hindu population (those with first-born daughters). Given 
that inequality in land rights and gender inequality are among the most egregious forms of  
inequality in many poor countries, it is a matter of  grave concern that son-biased inheritance rules 
appear to drive a trade-off  between them.  
                                                          
1 The effect sizes we report are not comparable between the two data sets since the first uses district-year 
variation in the share of tenant farmers registered under the reform and the second uses village-year 
variation in the share of cultivable land registered.  
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A closely related paper analysing the Chinese land reform finds a broadly similar result, 
namely that child sex ratios became more male-biased after land reform (Almond, et al., 2013b). 
However, the Chinese reform did not privatize land ownership and, importantly, intergenerational 
transfer of  land was impossible. 2  Moreover, men and women had equal rights in the state 
redistribution of  land. This shuts down the mechanism that we argue drives the results for India. 
The authors argue that income gains from land reform in China raised both the desire to have 
sons and the feasibility of  fulfilling this desire by, for instance, being able to afford travel to 
provincial capitals for female abortion. As discussed, our findings are conditional on agricultural 
productivity and household characteristics (including education, caste) that may be correlated with 
household-specific gains from land reform. Thus, while our results are similar, the mechanisms 
and hence the substantive implications are different. Almond, et al. (2013b) identify small positive 
effects of  land reform on fertility, consistent with income effects of  land reform. We identify 
negative effects on fertility which are not sensitive to controls for productivity, and our finding 
that the fertility reduction is restricted to first-son Hindu families fits with the inheritance motive. 
Together with previous research showing that Operation Barga led to increased investments in 
children’s education (Deininger, et al., 2011), our finding suggests that land reform shifted families 
along the quantity-quality trade-off  frontier. 
The rest of  the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion 
of  land reform in India, Operation Barga in West Bengal, and prevailing son preference norms. 
Section 3 sets out a theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we 
discuss the data, Section 5 outlines our empirical methodology, and in Section 6 we present our 
results and a discussion of  mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1  Historical Context  
Upon national independence in 1947, the Indian central government initiated three main 
types of  land reforms to address large historical inequalities in land distribution. These were 
abolition of  intermediaries, new tenancy laws to protect against eviction and extraction of  
excessive rental crop shares by landlords, and land ceilings to limit the amount of  land held by any 
one household with the aim of  vesting and redistributing surplus land to small farmers. 
Implementation of  the reforms was left to individual state governments. However, barring 
intermediary abolition in nearly all states, landlords were able to subvert the remaining reform 
measures by way of  pre-emptive tenant evictions and parcelling land to relatives to avoid state 
                                                          
2 Initially, the Chinese reform granted a 3-5 year lease to households, extended in 1984, to 15 years. 
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confiscation of  above-ceiling holdings (Appu, 1996). Variation in state-level reform 
implementation and legislation over time has been used in previous studies to empirically estimate 
land reform impacts on poverty, equity, and human capital (Besley & Burgess, 2000; Ghatak & 
Roy, 2007; Ghosh, 2008). West Bengal’s land reform was an unusual success amidst myriad failures, 
and a number of  influential studies have analysed economic impacts of  Operation Barga 
(Banerjee, et al., 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011; Bardhan, et al., 2012; Bardhan, et al., 2013). 
 Reforms in the state of West Bengal were spurred by the outcome of the 1977 state 
assembly election, following a Maoist land-based movement in late 1960s. The Left Front coalition 
won an absolute majority, which it retained until 2011. This new government created a three-tier 
system of local governments called panchayats, which for the first time would be democratically 
elected. These tiers in descending order of size of jurisdiction were district, block, and finally the 
gram panchayat that operated at the village level with a jurisdiction of 10-15 hamlets (mouzas). Many 
national development programmes as well as aspects of new state welfare initiatives such as 
Operation Barga were then decentralised to gram panchayats, who were responsible for selecting 
local eligible beneficiaries and lobbying the upper tiers of the new system for funds (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2011).  
 
2.2 Operation Barga and the Green Revolution 
West Bengal, along with Kerala, was an exceptional state in terms of  the effort and success 
with which the state government pursued land reforms. Registration protected sharecroppers from 
eviction by landlords, giving them permanent, tenancy rights and capping  the share of  the crop 
payable as rent to landlords to 25 percent.3 The tenancy rights could be used as collateral for loans 
and could be passed on to their heirs. By 1981 over 1 million sharecropper tenants were registered, 
and almost 1.5 million by 1990 (Lieten, 1992). Estimates of  the fraction of  sharecroppers 
registered in the state range from 45% (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011), to 65% (Banerjee, et. al., 
2002), to as high as 80% (Lieten, 1992).  
Besides Operation Barga, the state also aimed to vest land held by households above the 
stipulated ceiling of  12.5 acres and redistribute it to the landless and small landowners in small 
plots (or pattas). Most vesting of  land had already taken place by 1978, so the Left Front 
government’s main role was in redistributing this land. Appu (1996) estimates that 6.72 percent of  
state operated area was distributed by 1992; several times the national average of  1.34 percent. 
However, this land was redistributed in small plots (less than half  an acre on average in the sample 
of  farms in Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011)), and was of  low quality for cultivation as landlords 
                                                          
3 This share rose to 50 percent if landlords provided all non-labour inputs. 
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would only part with their lowest quality above-ceiling holdings. Hence unlike tenant registration, 
land redistribution had virtually no impact on agricultural productivity (Bardhan & Mookherjee 
(2011). 
 There were other government initiatives launched in the state at the same time, including 
decentralization, local infrastructure investment and programmes aimed at boosting agricultural 
productivity and reducing poverty. Alongside Operation Barga, the state government also 
distributed minikits containing high yield variety (HYV) seeds, fertilisers, and insecticides to 
farmers throughout the state via gram panchayats. 4  Land reform in combination with minikit 
distribution led to a substantial increase in agricultural yields in West Bengal over the 1980s, 
transforming the state into one of  the best agricultural performers in the country and leading this 
period to be called West Bengal’s Green Revolution. This period is also associated with significant 
declines in poverty and growth in rural employment. Banerjee, et al. (2002) attributed the increase 
in yields to land reform, citing decreased Marshall-Mill sharecropping distortions from increased 
tenancy security. Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011) however shows that while decreased inefficiencies 
played a role in increasing yields, it was largely minikit distribution that was responsible for the 
agricultural growth in this period. 5  Other programmes administered in the 1980s with gram 
panchayats targeting local beneficiaries include the Integrated Rural Development Programme that 
provided subsidised credit, and employment initiatives such as the Food for Work programme, the 
National Rural Employment Programme, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Programme.  
 
2.3   Son Preference 
The majority Hindu community in India traditionally exhibits greater son preference than 
other religious communities, as evidenced by conditional sex ratios in the population and empirical 
evidence on child mortality and education that reflect childhood parental investments (Bhalotra & 
Zamora, 2009; Bhalotra & Cochrane, 2010; Bhalotra, et al., 2010). The literature in this regard has 
focused on Hindu-Muslim differences, as other religious communities make up a very small part 
of  the population.6  
                                                          
4 The crops for which seeds were distributed were rice, potatoes, oilseeds, and some other vegetables 
according to Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011).  
5 A companion paper Bardhan, et al., (2012) also shows that tenancy reform crowded in large private 
investments in irrigation, the growth-inducing effects of which were far greater than those of reduced 
Marshall-Mill distortions. 
6 We do the same in this section, as Hindu and Muslim children constitute about 98% of our estimation 
sample. 
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While no definitive explanation has been agreed upon for the differing degrees of  son 
preference between the Indian Hindu and Muslim communities, existing arguments such as the 
Dyson-Moore hypothesis base them in marital institutions and inheritance practices. In North 
India including West Bengal, Hindu marriage is exogamous for women, who leave their natal family 
village to marry into families in villages much further away to avoid marrying a possible relative. 
The distance from natal family after marriage reduces Hindu women’s bargaining power and also 
their claim to natal family land, which is seen as bringing no reciprocal benefit and lost to the 
family when daughters inherit. Sons on the other hand care for parents and natal family members 
in their old age by remaining with the natal family and working the family land, eventually inheriting 
it upon the death of  the family patriarchs. Cultural taboos against Hindu women sharing public 
spaces with men and working agricultural land also often prevent them from claiming and 
cultivating land (Agarwal, 2003). The bridal dowry practice also often entails loss or mortgage of  
family land at the time of  a daughter’s marriage. With regard to Operation Barga specifically, Gupta 
(2002) finds from interviews of  870 households in two West Bengal districts  that 99% of  
households reported dowry being a serious concern, and that mortgaging barga land to meet dowry 
payments was a common practice. She also finds that dowry was largely a Hindu practice, but that 
the custom has penetrated younger generations of  Muslims. 
Under the Mitakshara Hindu doctrine followed in North India, women in fact have no 
claim to joint family property, whereas men are entitled at birth to a share of  such family property 
held by their fathers, paternal grandfathers, and paternal great-grandfathers.7 In South India close-
kin marriages are more prevalent for Hindu women, allowing them to inherit a greater share of  
ancestral land despite prevailing Mitakshara doctrine as they reside close enough to participate in 
cultivation on natal family land after marriage. These marital institutions have been used to explain 
more favourable female-male sex ratios in South India compared to North India (Chakraborty & 
Kim, 2010). In West Bengal the Dayabhaga Hindu system of  inheritance is followed where the 
concept of  joint family property is absent, and all of  a Hindu male’s property is subject to equal 
claims by his widow, sons, and daughters upon his intestate death (Lingat, 1973). While this appears 
more gender-equal than the Mitakshara system in theory, in practice Hindu women nearly always 
relinquish their inheritance claims to their brothers and sons so as to avoid social exclusion, 
intimidation, and losing the family safety net in times of  financial crisis (Agarwal, 2003). Hindu 
upper caste women also do not physically work agricultural land due to prevailing social norms. 
                                                          
7 Some Indian states have since made reforms to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to give women equal 
inheritance rights to joint family property, but these reforms still explicitly exclude agricultural land from 
their purview. 
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Lower caste women have higher work-force participation rates in agriculture as wage labourers, 
but still female employment rates in agriculture in the state have been persistently low.8 Hindu 
women therefore are very much financially dependent on their male kin, leading them to give up 
their rights to family land to avoid losing that support.  
 Muslim communities follow inheritance practices based in the Shariat, which guarantees 
women at least half  as much inheritance as their closest male counterpart inheritors. 
Consanguineous marriage is also practiced to keep all ancestral property within the family, allowing 
Muslim women to remain close to their natal families after marriage and inherit more family 
property in practice similar to Hindu women in South India.9 Marital dowry is also less prevalent 
among Muslims, and abortion, sex selective or otherwise, is strictly forbidden under the Shariat. 
The effect of  these institutions arguably reduces parental neglect of  Muslim female children 
compared to Hindu female children in many parts of  the country including West Bengal, despite 
the fact that the Muslim minority population experience nationally higher levels of  poverty than 
the Hindu majority and Muslim female labour force participation in West Bengal is even lower 
than that of  Hindu women (Nasir & Kalla, 2006; Chakraborty & Chakraborty, 2010).  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Under Operation Barga, agricultural tenants benefited in two respects, increased land 
security and a greater share of  agricultural output. At the same time, landlords faced reduced land 
rights and rents and it has been documented that the reform led large landowners to, in some 
cases, sell some of  their landholdings to smaller landowners.10 In addition, there were positive 
general equilibrium effects on land productivity across all farm sizes the economy, associated for 
instance with sharecropper registration crowding-in significant private irrigation investments that 
generated spill-overs across both tenant and non-tenant farms so that Operation Barga had large 
indirect impacts on small cultivators and wage labourers who were not involved in sharecropping 
as landlords or tenants (Bardhan, et al., 2012).  
Income gains among tenant farmers will have tended to increase investments in boy and 
girl survival, although possibly to different extents. We posit that substitution effects were biased 
                                                          
8 In the 1991 Census of India only 11.1 percent of women in West Bengal reported having any form of 
employment, and only 54.1% of the employed women were cultivators or agricultural labourers. National 
Sample Survey data also reflects decreasing female rural employment and increased casualisation of female 
agricultural labour since the late 1980s. 
9 Bittles (2002) reported that 23% of Muslims in India practiced consanguineous marriages in 1992–1993. 
10 The sale and transfer of  land for marriage expenses and dowry of  Hindu daughters are thought to have 
constituted a significant share of  land market transactions stimulated by Operation Barga, and this may 
have contributed to intensifying among new parents a desire to have sons rather than daughters (Gupta, 
1993; Kodoth, 2005). 
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in favour of  sons on account of  Hindu marriage and inheritance norms (varilocality and male-
biased inheritance). We sketch a model to clarify the nature of  wealth and substitution effects and 
how these may vary with household and village characteristics. We can represent the value placed 
on child i by parents in household j in a given village as follows, 
 
                          vi = (K - δ1 gi) exp[(α – δ2 gi)Wj + π(1 – fj )(1- gi) θ(β){lj + βt(lj)}]                       (1) 
 
where the first term denotes the wealth effect and the second the substitution effect. We can write 
household wealth Wj as, 
 
          Wj = θ(β){lj + βt(lj)} + F                                                      (2) 
 
Here gi is a dummy variable taking value 1 if  child i is a girl. δ1 > 0 indicates intrinsic gender bias 
against girls. Wj is household wealth, α > 0 is a common wealth effect on child values, and δ2 >0 
indicates gender bias in the wealth effect. θ is village land productivity, which is an increasing 
function of  the fraction β of  cultivable land that is tenanted and registered under Operation Barga, 
consistent with the evidence in the preceding section. lj  is land owned by the household, and t(lj) 
is net land leased by the household. F is household non-land wealth. Households owning more 
land lease in less, so t is a decreasing function of  l with t(0) > 0, and t(l*) = 0 for some l* > 0. 
Therefore, those with land holdings less than l* lease in land from those with land holdings greater 
than l*. 11 The parameter π represents the ‘substitution’ effect (which is larger for Hindus), that is 
the added value of  having a boy to inherit the household tenancy rights valued at θ(β){lj + βt(lj)}. 
The substitution effect manifests only if the household has no first-born son, i.e. the dummy 
variable for the first child in household j being male, represented by fj, equals zero. 
The general equilibrium effects of  Operation Barga come through increased village land 
productivity β, which applies uniformly for all landowners. A partial equilibrium property rights 
effect is represented by the dependence of  lj + βt(lj) on β, which is increasing in lj for those owning 
less than l* and decreasing in lj for those owning more. We assume that landless households form 
the bulk of  sharecropping tenants that benefit directly from registration. 12 
For these landless households, Operation Barga unambiguously raises household wealth 
and value placed on children through a direct improvement in property rights on rented land and 
                                                          
11 As a further restriction, land cultivated by the household is l + t(l) which must be non-negative and 
increasing in l, so the t function must have a slope less than one in absolute value. 
12 Bardhan, et al. (2014) reports that 80% of surveyed households were landless or marginal landowners. 
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increased village land productivity β. The curvature of  the logistic function in (1) also means that 
for a unit increase in wealth, there is a larger increase in child value the smaller the size of  the 
household’s landholding. However, due to the gender bias parameters δ1 and δ2 the value placed 
on boys will increase more than for girls, especially in Hindu families.  
For landowners with holdings greater than l*, the sign of  the wealth effect is ambiguous 
as the general equilibrium effects and property rights effects operate in different directions: we 
cannot sign the slope of  θ(β){lj + βt(lj)} with respect to β, unless the θ function is assumed to be 
rising fast enough. Likewise, the substitution effect cannot be signed. In any case, the curvature of  
the logistic function implies that a unit increment in wealth will lead to smaller increases in child 
value for this category of  households than for landless households. 13  Additionally, larger 
landowning households are wealthier than the landless, and therefore place a higher value on 
children to begin with. 
Increasing values placed on children will translate into reductions in infant mortality rates. 
Effects on fertility are more complicated, owing to possible quantity-quality trade-offs of  the sort 
emphasized by Becker and Lewis (1973). Son preference and male-biased inheritance patterns also 
may lead to a fertility decline that manifests through son-biased fertility stopping, which would 
increase infant survival amongst children who grow up in smaller families.  
Predictions testable with the available data are as follows. We expect that in landless Hindu 
families with a first-born daughter, parental investments will modify the sex ratio by age one in 
favour of  males, relative to landowning Hindu families with first-born daughters, relative to Hindu 
families with first-born sons, and relative to non-Hindu (Muslim or Christian) families. Averaging 
across households at the village or district level, if  the share of  landless and small landowning 
households was large enough, then we may expect predictions for these households to dominate. 
 
 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We use two independently gathered household survey data sets, the all-India National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS) and a household panel survey of  2,400 households across 89 
villages of  West Bengal conducted for the purpose of  gathering reliable data on land reform 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011). We merge the district level share of  tenant farmers registered 
                                                          
13 We include marginal landowners with lj less than l* in the same category as large landowners in the 
empirical analysis. This allows for clean estimation of the effects of improved property rights on infant 
mortality among the landless without confounding wealth effects from landholdings, and serves only to 
bias estimated coefficients towards zero among landed households. 
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(from Banerjee, et al., 2002) with the NFHS household data, and the village level share of  cultivable 
land area registered with the West Bengal survey data. This way, we test robustness of  our results 
to different measures of  reform. In all of  the analysis, the dependent variables are at the individual 
level. Since the treatment is at the village or district level, we account for the non-independence 
of  the errors within the treatment unit. 
A particular advantage of  the NFHS for our purposes is that it is representative of  the 
state of  West Bengal and it records the entire birth history of  all women aged 13 or 15 to 49 at 
the time of  the survey, allowing us to identify the exact date of  birth and death for children. 
Moreover, we have fertility histories for biological mothers, so although many Indian households 
have a complex structure, we can unambiguously identify the birth order and sex of  every child, 
which is important in constructing an indicator for the sex of  the first born child. While the West 
Bengal survey data do not have these strengths, they contain a more reliable measure of  tenancy 
reform and unique information on household-level land holdings and migration histories which 
help us test whether the effects of  tenancy reform were larger in sub-groups where we predict 
they are larger. They also contain data on village-level exposure to other programs, and on farm-
level agricultural productivity, which are important controls. We introduced similar controls in the 
NFHS data analysis using further data sources described in the next section.   
 
4.1   District level rollout and NFHS household data 
We pool the 1992-93 and 1998-99 waves of  the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) 
data as these rounds contain a district identifier for every household. The data are transposed to 
create identifiers for the district and year of  birth of  every child, and these data are then merged 
with district-level sharecropper registration rates for the 14 districts that the state had at the time. 
The rollout data are from Banerjee, et al. (2002). 
Panels A and B of  Table 1 outline descriptive characteristics of  children in the NFHS 
sample born during 1967-93 and their mothers. Neonatal and infant mortality rates are 6.4% and 
9.4% respectively. The probability that a child is male is 51.1%, and the probability the child has a 
younger sibling is 71.8%. As many as 68% of  mothers reside in rural areas, and the average age at 
which they give birth is 19.03 years. The average years of  education of  mothers in the sample is 
3.42 years and they have an average of  3.39 births. 75% of  mothers are Hindu.  
We obtained district-level data on yields and area under cultivation of  rice in West Bengal from 
the ICRISAT Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA) database to construct measures of  annual 
district rice productivity in thousands of  tonnes of  output per one thousand hectares for the years 
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1977-1990.14 We also collected district time series information from the annual Economic Survey 
reports of  the West Bengal government to control for the effects of  other programmes and 
infrastructure. Specifically, we gathered information on the number of  medical institutions per 
capita, kilometres of  surfaced roads per capita, and hectares of  patta land distributed per capita. 
Descriptive statistics for the district-year varying controls are in Panel C of  Table 1.15  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of  the tenant registration rate over time. There is no positive 
registration recorded in the data prior to 1978, although registration of  tenants has begun under 
the previous government.16 Sharecropper registration occurred most rapidly up until 1985, after 
which the pace slowed considerably.  The analysis sample includes births during 1978-1991, as we 
do not have information on district-level programmes other than land reform after this year.  
 
4.2   Village-level rollout and primary survey data 
The primary household survey data collected in West Bengal include family histories, land 
ownership, immigration status, and other household characteristics since 196717 The questionnaire 
elicited information from the head about all members residing in the household in 2004, including 
the year they were born or joined the household. It reports the births of all children in the 
household, but only for those that survived till 2004. We therefore have a compound measure of 
sex of birth and gender-differentiated survival. We define an indicator for the first-born child being 
a son somewhat crudely using the sex of the first child in the household, who may or may not be 
the child of the household head.  
The survey data were used to construct a household panel for 2,400 households from 89 
villages. For approximately two-thirds of this sample, a consistent history of household 
landholdings and demographics could be constructed (we call this the ‘restricted sample’; details 
are in Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011)). For the rest a consistent history could be constructed under 
specific assumptions on the nature of recall errors. While we report only results from the restricted 
sample, we verify that the results do not differ qualitatively in the full sample.18 
Information on land reform implemented in each of the 89 surveyed villages during 1971-
2003 for both the land distribution and tenant registration arms of the land reform programme 
                                                          
14 We construct and control for similar productivity measures for other cereals, but we do not report these 
coefficients as these crops form a very small part of total crop yields in West Bengal as described in Section 
3. 
15 These are the years for which these measures enter the regressions as controls; see Section 5. 
16 We allow for pre-1978 registration when we move on to analyse the West Bengal survey data that contain 
more reliable data acquired by Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011) from village land registers. 
17 Further details on this survey data are in Bardhan & Mookherjee (2010), Bardhan & Mookherjee (2011), 
and Bardhan, et al. (2014). 
18 The results from the full sample are in Table A.12 in the Appendix. 
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was collected from Block Land Records Offices. It is unusual to have data compiled firsthand 
from official land records rather than from indirect sources. Data quality aside, the share of 
cultivable village land registered is probably a better measure than the share of tenants registered. 
A concern with using the share of tenants registered is that where the potential number of tenants 
is small, but most of  them are registered, we would get a misleadingly high measure of  the intensity 
of  the program. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics from these primary survey data for the years 1978-99, 
which are the years we include in our regression sample.19  Panel A shows that as in the NFHS 
sample, a majority 79.7% share of  households are Hindu, and there are more surviving boys 
(1.051) than surviving girls (0.937). This difference is also visible in Panel B, which reports the 
average probability of survival conditional upon birth for boys and girls in a household-year during 
1978-99. Panel C shows the average percent of village cultivable land registered (barga) and 
distributed (patta). 
So as to smooth over measurement error and also to allow for a lag in household 
behavioural responses, in the estimation we measure the extent of reform activity as the percentage 
of village cultivable land registered under sharecropping (barga) in the three years preceding the 
birth year of a surviving birth. We control for the land re-distribution component of the program, 
which involved awarding small plots (pattas) to farmers. The survey data show that approximately 
15% of surveyed households had received patta land by 1998. However, the distributed plots were 
small and of poor quality, and were not eligible to be used as collateral for subsidised credit. Land 
distribution was therefore largely ineffective in increasing rice productivity. In contrast, plots 
registered under barga (the tenancy reform) were of a much larger size (1.5 acres on average), and 
could be used as collateral for loans from state financial institutions, yielding much greater positive 
impacts on rice productivity (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011).  The survey data show that about 
48% of sharecropper tenants, or 6% of surveyed households, had been registered by the late 1990s. 
Figure 2 shows the average cumulative share of village cultivable land registered over the years 
1967-1998 for the 89 surveyed villages. As in Figure 1, we see that registration peaks in 1985. The 
decline in average share of cultivable land thereafter is due to a slowdown in registration, combined 
with an increase in village cultivable land (the denominator) on average over the 1980s. 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
                                                          
19 We start the sample in 1978 so as to make the estimates more comparable with those from the NFHS 
data. The year 1999 is the last year for which we have complete data on land registered in the village in the 
previous three years, which is our measure of reform intensity using these data. 
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We first specify a test for pre-trends in the outcomes, and then the estimating equations for birth, 
sex at birth and sex-differentiated mortality after birth as a function of  land reform.  
5.1.   Test for targeting of  sharecropper registration 
If  the rate of  tenant registration was correlated with pre-reform trends in the outcome 
variables, the estimated impacts of  registration on the outcomes may be spurious. For instance, 
registration may have progressed more rapidly in districts where male infant mortality was already 
declining faster than female infant mortality (and more so in households with first-born daughters). 
To investigate this, we use pre-reform data on the outcomes. Since registration is a continuous 
variable we discretize it by assigning districts as “treated” or not depending on whether they had 
achieved above or below-median levels of  registration by 1985. We chose 1985 because registration 
occurred most rapidly up until 1985 (Figure 1). We use a sample of  children of  birth order 2 or 
higher born before the programme, during 1958-77. We then regress the outcomes of  interest on 
“treated” interacted with a linear time trend. A significant coefficient on this interaction term will 
reveal whether district pre-programme trends in the outcomes were correlated with a district 
becoming a “treated” (or high intensity reform) district in the future. Since the main equations are 
estimated with first-son interactions, the stricter test of  pre-trends includes this interaction. The 
estimated equation for infant mortality for instance is, 
 
            yihjt = α + β1 treatedj * trendt * firstsonh * femalei  
+ three-way interactions  + two-way interactions + main effects    
                       + λ xihjt + dt + θj + εihjt                                                           (3) 
 
where yihjt is the infant mortality outcome for child i of  mother or household h, born in district j in 
year t.  treated is the indicator for above-median district registration in 1985, trend is a linear time 
trend for the pre-reform years 1958-77 and we include all three and two-way interactions and main 
effects though these are not displayed. The covariates included in xihjt are the same as in (4), except 
that controls for other district programmes and infrastructure are not included here as they are 
not available for the pre-reform years. We estimate analogous equations for the other outcomes, 
fertility and the sex ratio at birth. 
5.2   Strategy using NFHS households and district rollout 
We estimate equations for infant mortality, the probability of  a male birth and fertility-
stopping using OLS on the sample of  children of  birth order two or higher born during 1978-
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91.20 We carry out separate estimations for Hindu and Non-Hindu children for reasons discussed 
earlier. As the indicator of  reform varies at the district level and there are only 14 districts, the 
standard errors are wild cluster-bootstraped (Cameron, et al., 2008), using the procedure in Busso 
et al. (2013). 
On the premise that the sex of  the first child is random (established in Bhalotra & 
Cochrane, 2010) and that households with first-born sons (who can inherit land titles) have limited 
incentive to manipulate the sex ratio of  their children, we interact the land reform indicator with 
an indicator for the gender of  the first-born child. Since our hypothesis is that exposure to land 
reform leads parents to manipulate the survival chances of  sons relative to daughters, we further 
interact this term with the gender of  the index child. The first outcome we analyse is infant 
mortality. The estimated specification is 
  
                         yihjt = α + β1k Rkjt-1 * firstsonh * femalei  
             + δ1k R kjt-1 * femalei  
             + η1k Rkjt-1 * firstsonh 
             + φ1 firstsonh +  φ2 femalei + φ3 firstsonh * femalei 
             + γ1k Rkjt-1  + λ xihjt +  dt + θj + εihjt                                         (4) 
 
where yihjt is a dummy variable taking value 1 if  child i of  mother or household h, born in district j 
in year t died aged 0-12 months and 0 otherwise, Rkjt-1 is a vector of  dummies which take the value 
1 if  sharecropper registration rate in district j reaches at least 25% or 50% respectively (we set k=2) 
in the year preceding the child’s birth year, and 0 otherwise. These measures are cumulative, such 
that the indicator for 25% coverage is always equal to 1 when the indicator for 50% coverage is 
equal to 1. The omitted category of  children constitutes those born in districts where registration 
was less than 25% in the year preceding birth. We chose these threshold rates based on estimates 
from a more flexible specification.21 Note that we would only expect linearity in the registration 
rate if  all districts had the same tenancy rates at baseline, which was not the case. The variable 
firstsonh  indicates households with a first born son and femalei indicates that the index child is female. 
We exclude first-born children from the sample.  
                                                          
20 We also check for consistency of estimates by including first-born children in the sample and coding the 
first-born son indicator as zero for these first-borns, and also by restricting the sample to the first two 
children only. The results do not change, and are available from the authors upon request.  
21 We tested for significant effects of cumulative sharecropper registration rates in 10 percent increments, 
and we tested for a quadratic in registration rates. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 2 shows the evolution of  sharecropper registration rates for the 14 districts in our 
sample. The light grey cells indicate the year that 25% registration of  all sharecroppers is achieved, 
and dark grey cells indicate the year when 50% registration is achieved. The figure shows sufficient 
variation across districts in the years in which these thresholds in programme implementation are 
achieved. Since all districts in West Bengal experienced tenant registration and the variation is only 
in rates of  progression, we also report results from estimating (4) including children born in 
bordering districts in the neighbouring state of  Bihar as a control group, as these children are never 
exposed to land reform.22 
There are effectively four dimensions across which we exploit differences to achieve 
identification, which are district, year of  birth, child gender, and the gender of  the first-born child 
in the household. The impacts are identified independently of  child birth year and district fixed 
effects captured in dummies dt and θj. We test robustness to including district-specific linear trends 
in child birth year to control for district specific unobservable trends that may be simultaneously 
correlated with sharecropper registration rates and infant mortality risk. The covariate vector xihjt 
includes indicators for child birth order, household religion and caste, whether the household is 
rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms in the age of  the mother at 
the birth of  the child. So as to allow for individual selection into programme uptake or fertility, we 
also estimate the specification with mother fixed effects. Mother fixed effects absorb district fixed 
effects since mothers typically do not migrate between births. 
Productivity was increasing in West Bengal in the period studied. To some degree this was 
the result of  land reform incentivizing improved input use, including investments in irrigation, and 
some of  it flowed from a contemporaneous programme which involved distribution of  subsidized 
inputs for high-yielding variety seeds that were being adopted as the Green Revolution swept 
through the area (Banerjee, et al. 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011).  To control for increased 
agricultural yields in this era, we estimate specifications including the log of  district productivity 
of  rice (ln rice yieldjt-1) in the year prior to the child’s birth as a regressor, interacted with indicators 
for the sex of  the first-born child and the sex of  the second or higher-order index child. Rice is 
the major crop in West Bengal, accounting for more than 70% of gross cropped area during 1971-
1991 according to state government economic reviews, but we also controlled for yield of all other 
cereals. 
To further control for any confounding effects of  public health improvements, 
infrastructural development, and the other arm of  the land reform, we include controls for the 
                                                          
22 These specifications do not include district health and infrastructure programme controls, as these are 
not available for (or relevant for) Bihar. 
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logarithm of  medical institutions per capita, kilometres of  surfaced road per capita, and hectares 
of  patta land distributed per capita in the district in the year preceding the child’s birth, and their 
interactions with index child gender and the gender of  the first-born child.  
We investigated impacts of  tenancy reform on the sex ratio at birth. Although prenatal 
sex detection technology was not widely or cheaply available in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
previous work has identified tendencies towards female infanticide and under-reporting of  girl 
births.  We define an outcome variable taking value 1 if  child i is male and 0 otherwise. The 
regressor of  interest, as before, is the tenant registration rate interacted with an indicator for a 
first-born son. We first estimate these equations for first births so as to test our assumption that 
the sex of  first births is quasi-random. We then estimate the equation for second and higher order 
births to test whether sex at birth is modified by land reform in the same direction as sex after 
birth (via infant mortality). The sex of  a birth is, of  course, conditional upon fertility. We assess 
any selection bias by estimating fertility responses to tenancy reform, which are also of  substantive 
interest.  
So as to investigate whether tenancy reform influenced fertility, we estimate an equation with the 
dependent variable an indicator taking value 1 if  index child i has a younger sibling and 0 otherwise. 
Given evidence that fertility-stopping behaviour at any time is sensitive to the sex composition of  
preceding children, and evidence that the sex of  the first born is quasi-random, we interact the 
sharecropper registration rate with the first-born son indicator. We estimated these specifications 
sequentially for separate samples of  children by birth order, so as to identify the margin at which 
households alter childbearing in response to land reform. We found no impact of  land reform on 
fertility-stopping after the first birth (Appendix Table A.1) and also no impacts on stopping after 
the third birth (available upon request). We therefore present estimates for stopping after the 
second birth, which is plausibly the relevant margin.   
 
5.3   Strategy with village rollout and household data 
These data do not contain full birth histories or exact dates of death so we are unable to 
directly identify either infant mortality or fertility. Instead, we model as outcomes the probability 
of a surviving girl, and a surviving boy being observed in 2004 (the last round of the village survey) 
in response to land registered under Operation Barga during 1978-99.23 We have their dates of 
birth but since we only observe a birth if it survives, the outcome compounds having a birth, the 
sex ratio at birth, and the sex ratio of survival, outcomes that earlier we separated.  We expect that 
                                                          
23 The last year for which land registration data is available from block records offices is 1998. 
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most of the observed differences in survival rates of boys and girls reflect differences in childhood 
mortality. The estimated specification is, 
 
                   yihjt = α + β1 Rjt-1 *firstsonh + firstsonh + λ xihjt +  dt + θh + εihjt                                              (5) 
 
where the outcome yihjt takes the value 1 if  a surviving boy (or girl) i is born in household h in 
village j in year t and 0 otherwise. The outcome variable takes value 1 when the surviving child 
born in year t is a boy (girl), and value 0 if  there is no birth in year t, or if  there is a surviving birth 
in year t that is a girl (boy).24 The indicator Rjt-1 measures the share of  cultivable land in village j 
that was registered in the three years preceding year t.25 The terms dt and θh are year and household 
fixed effects respectively, and εihjt  is an idiosyncratic error term. Household fixed effects absorb 
village fixed effects since mothers typically do not migrate between births. Using household fixed 
effects is a powerful means of  accounting for potentially correlated regional heterogeneity and 
household level selection. 
The regressors xihjt include (lagged) land owned by the household, an above-ceiling 
indicator (whether it owned more land than permitted by the land ceiling), patta land distribution, 
and immigrant status indicators (whether the household immigrated after 1967 (the earliest records 
we have), and year of  immigration) which are available for the full time period of  1971-199926 In 
alternative specifications we include controls constructed from the farm-level dataset of  Bardhan 
& Mookherjee (2011), which include the logarithm of  annual village rainfall, village land 
productivity, price of  rice, local government expenditures on roads and irrigation, and kilometres 
of  surfaced road and area irrigated by canals in the district. These regressors control for potential 
confounding effects of  local public spending on other programmes and economic shocks. This 
information is only available for years 1982-95 but using this shorter sample we show that including 
these controls does not qualitatively change the results. We define landowning classes, household 
land holdings, and the land ceiling indicator using pre-reform reported household landholdings in 
1977, to avoid endogenous sample selection on landholdings that may change due to the reform. 
                                                          
24 Hence estimating (5) separately for surviving male and female births will capture increases in gender-
specific survival rates in positive coefficients, and declines in fertility combined with reduced survival rates 
in negative coefficients. 
25 The results are robust to alternative definitions of registration intensity in these data, and these additional 
results are available upon request. 
26 In some specifications we include the share of  cultivable village land transacted in the three years 
preceding year t to examine if  income effects from these post-reform transactions explain any impacts we 
find. The results do not change significantly, and are available upon request. 
21 
 
Importantly, we also estimate (5) including district-year fixed effects, which control flexibly 
for any relevant time-varying unobservables at the district level. This is relevant since a majority 
of  public infrastructural and health spending decisions affecting individual villages are made at by 
the district level of  government.27  
As with specification (4), we present separate estimates for Hindu and Non-Hindu 
households. We further disaggregate results by whether households own land, and by household 
immigrant status. This is because landless immigrant households are the most likely beneficiaries 
of tenancy registration, while native landed households are the most likely to lose privileges on 
land.  
 
6.  Results 
6.1 Was sharecropper registration targeted? 
      Estimates of  equation (3) for infant mortality are in Table 4 and estimates of  the same 
equation for the probability of  a younger sibling and the probability of  a male birth are in Table 
5. We find no statistically significant correlations in any of  the three samples of  children between 
the pre-reform trend in infant mortality and the intensity of  registration in the district in 1985, by 
either the gender of  the child or the first-born sibling. The coefficients are all also nearly identical 
to zero.  
 
6.2  Results for infant survival 
      Table 6 reports estimates of  equation (3). Column 1 includes district and year fixed effects 
and the individual, household, and district-year controls indicated earlier. Controls for agricultural 
productivity are added in column (2) and district-specific linear trends in column (3). In general, 
coefficient size and significance is robust to the addition of  controls.28 The estimated coefficients 
are different in the Hindu and non-Hindu samples in the manner predicted. The coefficients for 
all children resemble the coefficients for Hindus since they constitute about 80% of  the sample. 
As the estimates are not significantly changed by addition of  controls, we discuss here the richest 
specifications, column (6) for Hindus and column (9) for non-Hindus.  
Consider Hindus first. Boys in families with a first-born girl show an infant mortality 
decline of  5.9 percentage points once district registration exceeds 50% (coefficient on R), and 
                                                          
27 Results from specifications including district-year fixed effects are in Appendix Tables A.11. The results 
including the full set of controls are available from the authors upon request. 
28 The results including children from untreated border districts in neighbouring state Bihar are in Appendix 
Table A.2, and show identical patterns. We display coefficients on rice productivity interacted with gender 
in Appendix Table A.5. 
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though a positive coefficient suggests a smaller decline in families with a first-born son, there is 
no statistically significant difference. In contrast, there is a sharp divergence in the effects for girls. 
In families with a first-born daughter, land reform elevates the risk that girls of  second and higher 
birth order die in infancy by 1.1 (7.0 minus 5.9) percentage points. Girls with first-born older 
brothers are, however, protected and they exhibit a decline in infant mortality of  5.4 (9.7 minus 
4.3) percentage points. A specification that incorporates mother fixed effects (Appendix Table 
A.4), produces broadly similar estimates, with boys exhibiting a 6% point reduction in infant 
mortality while girls exhibit a much smaller reduction (rather than an increase) in infant mortality 
of  0.09 percentage points. We split the sample into children of  birth order 2 and children of  higher 
birth order and found stronger impacts for children of   orders three and higher (Appendix Table 
A.8). This is consistent with most families being happy with one girl, especially if  they already have 
a son (see Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010, for example).  
In the non-Hindu sample, land reform is associated with reductions in infant mortality 
irrespective of  the sex of  the first child, and the reductions are not significantly different for boys 
and girls.  These are primarily Muslim (and Christian) communities and our findings are consistent 
with previous research which suggests that for religious reasons Muslims and Christians are less 
likely to engage in abortion and “silent killing” of  girls than Hindus (Bhalotra, et al., 2010; Bhalotra 
& Cochrane, 2010; Almond, et al., 2013a). 
Observe that every district in West Bengal was treated and that what we capture are the 
impacts of  varying progression of  tenancy reform across districts. We tested robustness to have a 
strict control group in which no tenants were registered, by introducing into the sample all districts 
of  the neighbouring state of  Bihar that are contiguous to West Bengal. The controls are as before 
(except for district-level infrastructure and healthcare measures, which are unavailable for Bihar) 
and include district-specific trends. The estimates are essentially unchanged, and this holds for the 
other outcomes too (Appendix Table A.2).  
So, overall, we find that land reform led to an intensification of  son preference expressed 
in manipulation of  the sex ratio of  second and higher order children surviving to age one in Hindu 
families in which the first child is a girl. Families that, at first birth, have had a son, show no 
tendency to manipulate the relative survival chances of  subsequent sons and daughters. These 
estimates are robust to controlling for gender-specific impacts of  productivity.  
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6.3  Results for sex ratio at birth 
      In Table 7 we report the estimated impact of  sharecropper registration on the 
probability a birth is male.29 First, we verify the assumption made earlier that the sex of  the first 
born is exogenous to tenancy reform (columns (1), (4), (7)). For birth orders 2+, we find that 
tenancy registration is associated with more male-biased sex ratios at birth (column (2)), although 
only in Hindu families with first-born girls. In these families, once district registration is at least 
50%, the probability that a birth is male rather than female is 5.5 percentage points higher (column 
(6)).30 There is no change in sex at birth in non-Hindu families.  
 
6.4  Results for son-biased fertility stopping 
The estimated impacts of  sharecropper registration on the probability a child of  birth 
order 2 has a younger sibling are in Table 8.31 The estimates are stable across specifications with 
successively richer controls. There are two relevant patterns. First, the overall tendency is for land 
reform to lower the probability of  transition to a third birth, and this is not sensitive to 
conditioning on yield, a measure of  income. Second, this reduction in fertility is evident among 
Hindu families with first-born sons and all non-Hindu families, but not in Hindu families with 
first-born daughters. These results are consistent with heritable land rights securing the attachment 
of  sons to the father’s property.32 The left-wing government that progressed land reform also 
decentralized and extended public services so this was a time when the shadow price of  child 
quality was probably falling, encouraging the trade-off  of  quantity in favour of  quality. However, 
we cannot test these speculations.    
Among Hindus with a first son, the probability of  a third birth declines by a statistically 
significant 10.8 percentage points (13.4% of  the mean pre-reform probability) once district 
registration exceeds 25% (and there is no further reduction at 50% coverage). There are no 
perceptible effects on fertility stopping after the second birth if  the first child is a daughter, 
consistent with these families continuing fertility to achieve a son.  This ties in with a previous 
literature showing that fertility stopping rules are sensitive to the sex of  previous births, with 
                                                          
29 The sex ratio results displaying estimates on the rice productivity terms are in Appendix Table A.6. For 
brevity, we only report estimates from the full specification inclusive of rice productivity controls and 
district-linear time trends in Table 7. The results including children from untreated border districts in 
neighbouring state Bihar are similarly available upon request.  
30 The increased male bias at birth is primarily at birth order 2 (Appendix Table A.9). 
31 The results including children from untreated border districts in neighbouring state Bihar are in Appendix 
Table A.3, and show identical patterns to those reported here. The estimates for rice productivity controls 
along with those in Table 4 are in Appendix Table A.7. 
32 By tradition, this would involve adult sons co-residing with parents on family land and providing old-age 
security. It seems plausible that this limits the need for parents to diversify their risks across a greater number 
of  children, and incentivizes them to invest in their first son. 
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families tending to continue fertility till they have achieved the desired sex composition of  births 
(e.g. Rosenblum, 2013). First-son families are smaller at baseline because of  underlying son-biased 
fertility stopping. Our results show that, after land reform, sibship size differences between first-
son and first-daughter families widened.  
Among non-Hindus, we see no evidence that land reform leads to changes in the sex ratio 
at birth or after, but we see similar son-biased fertility stopping behaviour. This is consistent with 
previous research which shows that Muslim households (which dominate the non-Hindu sample) 
exhibit a preference for sons by continuing fertility to achieve them rather than by practicing 
foeticide, infanticide or post-natal discrimination designed to eliminate girls.  In fact non-Hindus 
exhibit a greater decline in fertility, consistent with their higher baseline levels of  fertility and this 
is irrespective of  the gender of  the first child. At 25% coverage, the decline is, as for Hindus, 
restricted to first-son families, and as large as 18.2 percentage points (19.1% of  the mean). Once 
coverage reaches 50%, there is further fertility decline of  9.6 percentage points. 
Note that the sample in which we find land reform induced changes in the sex ratio of  
births and the sex ratio of  infant deaths (Hindus with first-born girls) is the sample in which we 
find no fertility reduction. This suggests that fertility decline did not contribute to the documented 
changes in boy and girl mortality. To summarize, land reform appears to increase both sex selection 
and postnatal discrimination in favour of  male children in Hindu families with first-born 
daughters, while having no impact on fertility in this sub-sample. However, among Hindu families 
with first-sons and non-Hindus, land reform leads to fewer (third) births. 
 
6.5  Results for gender of  surviving births and village-level tenancy registration  
We now move to analysis of the purposively conducted survey of households in West 
Bengal villages. See Table 9. As discussed, the dependent variable measures the likelihood of 
observing surviving children of either gender. We present estimates with and without conditioning 
upon average farm-level rice productivity in the village in the year prior to the child’s birth (results 
are similar if we take a three-year average). This controls for increased incomes following tenancy 
reform and productivity increases flowing from other programmes such as minikit distribution. 
These data are only available for years 1982-95, which reduces the sample substantially, but the 
results are robust to the added control and the smaller sample. The controls consistently include 
household fixed effects (which encompass village fixed effects), year fixed effects, indicators for 
immigrant status, total land owned, an indicator of whether land owned in 1977 was above the 
ceiling set by the state for redistribution, the share of village cultivable land re-distributed under 
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the contemporaneous patta programme and, in separate specifications, also rice productivity at the 
farm level. 
Overall, we see that a 10% increase in registration results in a significant decline of 0.08 to 
0.12 percentage points in the likelihood of observing a surviving girl, alongside a 0.06 to 0.11 
percentage point increase in the chances of observing a surviving boy.  Productivity increases, in 
this sample, act in the same direction as tenancy reform, worsening prospects for girls and 
improving them for boys. This makes it important to check whether controlling for productivity 
substantially depresses the coefficient on land registration which, in general, it does not. 
An advantage of these data is that they contain agricultural land holdings at the household 
level. We control for total land holdings, as they evolve with time. In addition, we use pre-reform 
household-level landholdings (in the year 1977) to split the sample into households with no land 
vs some land prior to reform. This is potentially instructive because landless households benefited 
more from tenancy reform. Consistent with this, we see that the impacts of registration on survival 
emerge mostly from landless households. Moreover, consistent with the preceding analysis of 
NFHS data, we find the widening of gender gaps in survival is primarily in households with a first-
born daughter. Specifically, we see a large increase of 0.26 to 0.54 percentage points (following a 
10% increase in village area registered) in the chances of observing surviving boys, and no change 
at all in the chances of observing surviving girls in landless households, consistent with boys 
gaining from tenancy reform, as documented using the NFHS data (Table 9).33  
Once we include interactions of registration with an indicator for the sex of the oldest 
child in the household, the pattern is clearer (Appendix Table A.10). Exactly as we saw earlier with 
the other data, it is only in families with a first-born daughter that there is a deterioration of survival 
chances of girls.  
Households that owned some land prior to reform are a mixed group, some may have lost 
by transferring title to their tenants, while smaller land-owners that also leased in land may have 
benefited, making it hard to offer firm predictions for this sample. We see smaller overall gains in 
child survival from land reform in this (otherwise richer) group than in the landless group. Indeed, 
conditional upon productivity, we see a deterioration in survival; a 10% increase in registration is 
associated with a 0.05 (0.16) percentage point decline in the survival chances of boys (girls). The 
distribution of survival chances still favours boys but the differences are smaller.  
                                                          
33  The results in Table 9 are sensitive to the existence of one outlier village with an unusually high 
registration rate. Alternative ways of treating this village, such as trimming registration rates, assuming 
registration for this village was reported in a unit of measure different from acres, or dropping all 
observations from the village, leaves our main result (namely a gap in the survival rate of boys and girls, 
particularly among landless households) unaffected in the main specification. However, when we control 
for productivity, the estimates are sensitive to inclusion of this village (estimates available on request). 
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Tables 10 and 11 explore heterogeneity of effects by religion, classifying the sample as 
Hindu and non-Hindu households using the name of the household head.34 The results show that 
the findings in Table 9 are driven entirely by Hindu households, similar to the findings in the 
NFHS data. Among Hindus, there is a positive and significant effect on male surviving births, a 
10% increase in registered land associated with a 0.25 percentage point and 0.07 percentage point 
decrease in landless and landed Hindu households respectively. The landless show a stronger 
response consistent with our predictions. The negative effect of land registration on surviving 
Hindu girls of 0.11 percentage points emerges from land-owning households. In non-Hindu 
households, the coefficient estimates indicate large (but imprecisely) estimated increases in survival 
probability for both sons and daughters, again consistent with what we find in the NFHS data.  
In Tables 12 and 13 we examine estimates by household immigrant status, restricting now 
to the Hindu sample where we consistently find effects of registration. The largest marginal effects 
are seen among landless immigrant households, the group that benefited most from tenancy 
reform. In this sample, a 10% increase in village land registered is associated with a 0.38 percentage 
point increase in boy survival chances alongside no change (the coefficient is zero) in girl survival 
chances. Among natives to the area, the only significant responses are among land-owners. In this 
group, there is a 0.06 percentage point increase in boy survival and a 0.11 percentage point 
deterioration in girl survival. So, in both groups, tenancy reform widened the girl-boy survival gap, 
and the largest absolute changes in survival occurred among immigrants who were landless pre-
reform.  
 
6.6   Mechanisms 
Using two entirely independent sources of  data, we have documented compelling evidence 
that in Hindu households and in particular those that had not had a son at first birth, tenancy 
reform encouraged a systematic tendency to favour sons over daughters, resulting in more male-
biased sex ratios by the age of  one year. We think the most likely interpretation of  this behaviour 
is that it was driven by male-biased inheritance rights.  
As discussed in the Introduction, Almond, et al. (2013b) is the only related study we know, 
looking at the impact of  changes in land rights on son preference in China, but a crucial difference 
is that the Chinese land rights were gender-neutral and not transferable across generations. 
                                                          
34 Since controlling for rice productivity shrinks the sample a lot, we do not report the results from 
specifications including average farm rice productivity in further results from the village data. These 
specifications show qualitatively identical results, and are available upon request. 
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Almond, et al. argue that land reform increased income and this raised the demand for sons and 
hence the sex ratio of  surviving births. 
Income is an important potential omitted variable in our analysis. Previous work has 
documented that, at the same time as land reform was implemented in West Bengal, there were 
other programmes that increased productivity and that, in addition, land reform led to increased 
productivity (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011; Banerjee, et al., 2002). We therefore condition on 
productivity. Since it is endogenous, we report results with and without it. In general, we find that 
the coefficient on tenancy registration is not significantly different (and that the point estimate is 
often larger) upon controlling for productivity.35  
Two further pieces of  evidence suggest that our findings are not driven by income effects 
of  land reform. First, we find that land reform has opposite effects in families with first-sons vs 
first-daughters. In particular, if  as in the China study, income raised the demand for sons because 
they are normal goods, we would not expect to see contrasting effects by sex of  first birth. In 
other words, income effects cannot explain our finding that girls benefit from land reform in first-
son families much more than in first-daughter families, but male-biased inheritance can. Second, 
Almond, et al. (2013b) find a small positive effect of land reform on fertility (after controlling for 
the negative effects of the One Child Policy), which is consistent with income effects being a 
dominant mechanism in China because income tends to raise fertility in low-income settings 
(Currie & Schwandt, 2014; Vogl, 2013; Bhalotra & Rocha, 2013). In contrast, we find a negative 
effect of land reform on fertility. In the non-Hindu sample where the sex ratio of births appears 
not to be manipulated by parents, we find across-the-board reductions in fertility after land reform. 
In the Hindu sample, fertility reduction is restricted to families that have a first-son, consistent 
with the first-daughter families continuing fertility to achieve a son. 
An alternative explanation of land reform strengthening the desire to have sons is that it 
raises the returns to labour, and males are more likely to be employed as farm labour. Using detailed 
farm-level data gathered alongside the West Bengal village survey data, we estimated whether the 
ratio of male to female labour was modified by land reform and find no evidence that it was (see 
Table A.13). We cannot conclusively rule out that the greater share of males among farm labour 
at baseline drives some of the identified effects of land reform on son preference. In any case, this 
links in ultimately with our preferred explanation, elucidated in the Introduction, in which the 
labour supply of sons on family farms and their inheritance rights are closely tied. In particular, 
                                                          
35 Moreover, the coefficients on district-level productivity and its interaction with gender indicate no 
significant gender difference in effects in the NFHS sample (except for non-Hindus, where girls benefit 
more), although the coefficients on farm-level productivity suggest a favour for boys in the village survey 
sample. 
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patrilocality involves married sons co-residing with or living very close to their parents, while 
married daughters marry some distance away from the natal home, so that it is primarily sons who 
work on family land and subsequently inherit it. 
In their discussion of alternative interpretations of their findings for China, Almond, et al. 
(2013b) observe that land reform in China destroyed the financial basis of the “state pension 
system,” forcing parents to rely on sons instead of the collective or state for old age support, and 
that the rural medical system also ended after Mao. In India, parents have always relied upon sons, 
but the reform providing tenants with rights to land that were heritable (by sons) will have 
strengthened this reliance. However, in contrast to the case of China, land reform in West Bengal 
coincided with an expansion of public services including public health, rural credit and other 
agricultural subsidies.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
 We find that increased property rights security exacerbates gender discrimination in Hindu 
families, with parents manipulating sex ratios at birth and after birth until the age of  one, so as to 
have at least one son. Land reform is also associated with greater son-biased fertility-stopping, 
leading to the sibship size difference between first-son and first-daughter families widening. There 
is evidence from other settings that land reform alters existing gender-unequal institutions in 
favour of  women, for instance, tenure regularisation is argued to have significantly improve 
women’s tenurial and inheritance claims to land in Rwanda (Ali, et al., 2014), and joint spousal 
titling increased women’s intra-household bargaining power in Peru (Wiig, 2013). Male-biased 
inheritance law in India appears to have thwarted its success in reducing poverty and improving 
child survival by skewing gains in favour of  one half  of  the population. 
Our results illustrate the importance in principle of  ensuring that women benefit directly 
from the formalisation of  property rights. However, in practice, evidence of  the effectiveness of  
equalization of  inheritance rights for women is ambiguous. Most worrying, is evidence that the 
equalization of  inheritance rights for women in India led to increased female foeticide, suggesting 
that when faced with the prospect of  being legally obliged to give daughters an equal share of  
ancestral property, parents seem to want all the more to eliminate daughters (Bhalotra, et al., 
2015).36 It seems, overall, that it may be difficult to engender compliance with legal reform unless 
                                                          
36 For girls that had already survived to school-age, Deininger, et al. (2013) and Roy (2015) find that the 
equalization of  property rights increased investment in girls’ education. Looking not at parental investments 
in children but rather at the impact of  inheritance rights on married adults, Anderson and Genicot (2015) 
find increased suicides of  men and women and especially men, indicating that the inheritance reform 
stimulated intra-household conflict. 
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the passage of  reform reflects changes in social preferences (Doepke & Zilibotti, 2005; also see 
Aldashev, et al., 2011).  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Share of  Tenants Registered by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Share of  Village Land Registered by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notes: The figure shows the average rate of completed sharecropper registration across 
the 14 West Bengal districts in the Banerjee at al. (2002) data during 1975-1991.  
 
 Notes: The figure shows the average percent of village cultivable land registered across 
the 89 villages from the household panel data survey during the years 1967-1998. The 
percent of cultivable land registered declines after 1985 as registration slowed during this 
period, while the amount of cultivable land increased on average.  
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Table 1: NFHS and District Summary Statistics 
 
 Freq. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A Mother Characteristics: 1967-1993 
Years of Education 6,443 3.416 4.297 0 18 
Age at Birth 6,468 19.034 3.532 5 40 
Total Births 6,468 3.386 2.010 1 11 
Hindu 6,468 0.750 - 0 1 
Rural 6,468 0.680 - 0 1 
Panel B Child Outcomes: 1967-1993 
Infant Death 20,148 0.094 - 0 1 
Neonatal Death 20,148 0.064 - 0 1 
Male Child 20,148 0.511 - 0 1 
Has Younger Sibling 20,148 0.718 - 0 1 
Panel C District Productivity and Programmes: 1977-1990 
Rice Productivity 196 1.473 0.434 0.720 2.595 
Patta Area Per Capita 196 6.518 4.937 0.321 17.986 
Surfaced Roads Per Capita 196 0.208 0.067 0.115 0.392 
Medical Institutions Per Capita 196 0.056 0.016 0.033 0.115 
Notes: Panel A shows mother characteristics, and Panel B shows child outcomes for cohorts 
born during 1967-1993. Panel C shows productivity and programme statistics in the 14 districts 
with sharecropper registration data for years 1977-1990, which are the years for which they 
enter as controls in the regressions. Neonatal death takes value 1 if the child dies aged 0-1 
months, and infant death takes value 1 if the child dies aged 0-12 months. 
 
Table 2: Village Data Summary Statistics 
 
 Freq. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A Household Characteristics: 1978-1999 
Hindu 2,334 0.797 - 0 1 
Immigrant 2,334 0.258 - 0 1 
Landless in 1977 2,334 0.511 - 0 1 
Household size 2,334 5.157 2.098 1 22 
Boys 2,334 1.051 1.051 0 7 
Girls 2,334 0.937 1.025 0 7 
Panel B Household-Year Characteristics: 1978-1999 
Boy birth and survival 46,167 0.053 - 0 1 
Girl birth and survival 46,167 0.047 - 0 1 
Agricultural Land (acres) 46,167 1.824 3.414 0 83.32 
Panel C Village-Year Characteristics: 1978-1999 
Proportion Land Registered (last 3 years) 1,958 0.021 0.279 0 6.623 
Proportion Land Distributed (last 3 years) 1,958 0.011 0.074 0 1.814 
Log(farm productivity) 306 6.94 0.448 5.165 8.284 
Notes: Panel A shows household characteristics, and Panel B shows household-year characteristics for years 
1978-1999. Panel C shows village-year characteristics for the same years. Boys and Girls in Panel A are the 
numbers of both who survive until the survey date.  
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Table 3 – District Sharecropper Registration Rates by Year 
 
 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
        Kochibihar 19.96 39.42 42.34 50.54 54.65 57.46 58.31 
Jalpaiguri 18.44 30.88 32.30 34.95 40.25 40.25 40.25 
Darjeeling 14.49 23.40 24.52 28.22 28.84 28.84 28.84 
West Dinajpur 34.88 66.41 70.77 73.86 75.63 76.74 76.77 
Maldah 44.15 60.93 69.75 74.40 76.57 78.32 79.24 
Murshidabad 15.82 43.01 44.69 53.09 56.80 58.89 60.79 
Nadia 22.99 37.20 42.79 49.52 52.74 53.35 55.71 
24-Parganas 15.22 38.54 42.84 47.67 49.51 49.84 54.05 
Howrah 31.05 44.56 48.67 54.63 56.12 57.32 58.22 
Hooghly 25.50 40.94 46.26 55.11 58.60 61.62 63.45 
Midnapur 16.79 44.89 55.70 61.09 62.84 63.64 63.82 
Bankura 29.69 68.67 74.48 84.46 89.66 92.56 93.83 
Burdwan 11.00 35.64 39.45 45.74 49.60 51.42 53.31 
Birbhum 25.01 59.26 72.49 91.37 95.67 98.30 100.00 
Mean 23.21 45.27 50.50 57.48 60.53 62.04 63.33 
        Notes: The table shows district sharecropper registration rates by year as reported in Banerjee et. al. (2002). 
37 
 
Table 4 – Test of  Targeted Registration: Infant Mortality 
 
 Infant Death 
  All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            treated * trend  -0.002 -0.005 -0.001  -0.000 -0.004 -0.002  -0.009 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
treated * trend * female - 0.007 0.006  - 0.008 0.008  - 0.006 0.001 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.011)   (0.009) (0.009) 
treated * trend * firstson * female - - 0.003  - - 0.001  - - 0.007 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
Observations 3,389 3,389 3,389  2,428 2,428 2,428  961 961 961 
Cohorts 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77  1958-77 1958-77 1958-77  1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children of  birth order 2 or higher. All specifications also include the female child and 
first-born son indicators and their three-way and two-way interactions with the trend and treatment indicator, birth year fixed effects, indicators for household religion 
and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 – Test of  Targeted Registration: Male Births and Fertility 
 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 Male Child Younger Sibling  Male Child Younger Sibling  Male Child Younger Sibling 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
treated * trend 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.004) 
treated * trend * firstson 
female 
- -0.009  - -0.012  - 0.003 
  (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008) 
District FE x x  x x  x x 
Observations 3,389 1,369  2,428 1,015  961 961 
Cohorts 1958-77 1958-77  1958-77 1958-77  1958-77 1958-77 
Districts 14 14  14 14  14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples for the sex ratio regressions include children of  birth order 2 or higher, and of  birth order 
2 for the fertility regressions. The specifications for the probability of  having a younger sibling also include the first-born son indicator and its interaction with the 
trend and treatment indicator, birth year fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and 
linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
38 
 
Table 6 – Infant Mortality 
 
 Infant Death 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
R50 t-1 * firstson * female -0.060* -0.075* -0.073*  -0.074** -0.097** -0.097**  -0.033 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.032) (0.046) (0.048)  (0.048) (0.054) (0.055) 
R25 t-1 * firstson * female 0.033 0.030 0.031  0.021 0.017 0.019  0.062 0.063 0.046 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.038)  (0.05) (0.051) (0.051)  (0.041) (0.045) (0.044) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.051*** 0.046** 0.046**  0.063*** 0.069** 0.070**  0.028 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.02) (0.022) (0.023)  (0.023) (0.03) (0.029)  (0.039) (0.046) (0.046) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.025 -0.029 -0.029  -0.024 -0.025 -0.027  -0.039 -0.046 -0.036 
 (0.03) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)  (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) 
R50 t-1 * firstson 0.028 0.040 0.039  0.015 0.043 0.043  0.046* 0.029 0.029 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.028) (0.031) (0.032)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.037 -0.035 -0.034  -0.041 -0.034 -0.035  -0.027 -0.031 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)  (0.029) (0.034) (0.03) 
R50 t-1 -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.063***  -0.040* -0.052* -0.059**  -0.072** -0.046 -0.078** 
 (0.02) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) 
R25 t-1  0.019 0.012 0.001  0.006 0.000 -0.003  0.051 0.035 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.03) (0.029) (0.031)  (0.030) (0.036) (0.039) 
firstson * female -0.019 -0.025 -0.022  -0.062 -0.104 -0.022  0.045 0.087 0.079 
 (0.13) (0.143) (0.140)  (0.163) (0.178) (0.140)  (0.222) (0.236) (0.232) 
female 0.192 0.163 0.164  0.181 0.170 0.164  0.209 0.178 0.179 
 (0.152) (0.132) (0.126)  (0.147) (0.134) (0.126)  (0.247) (0.259) (0.256) 
firstson 0.024 0.038 0.032  0.011 0.070 0.032  0.016 -0.026 -0.024 
 (0.114) (0.132) (0.134)  (0.17) (0.198) (0.134)  (0.127) (0.148) (0.142) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
District Rice Productivity  x x   x x   x x 
District-Year Trend   x    x    x 
Observations 8,367 8,367 8,367  5,448 5,448 5,448  2,919 2,919 2,919 
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.098 0.098 0.098  0.107 0.107 0.107  0.074 0.074 0.074 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: NFHS data. y refers to the dependent variable. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children of  birth order 2 or higher. All 
specifications also include birth year fixed effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the 
household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. District covariates include logs of  patta 
land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their interactions with the female child and the first-born son 
indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 – Sex Ratio at Birth 
 
 Child is Male 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. >1 B. Ord. >1  B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. >1 B. Ord. >1  B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. >1 B. Ord. >1 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
             
R50 t-1 * firstson - - -0.011  - - -0.014  - - 0.004 
   (0.020)    (0.019)    (0.047) 
R25 t-1 * firstson - - -0.005  - - 0.005  - - -0.033 
   (0.027)    (0.031)    (0.062) 
R50 t-1  -0.020 0.039* 0.045*  -0.065 0.048** 0.055**  0.091 0.042 0.039 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.025)  (0.050) (0.024) (0.029)  (0.064) (0.035) (0.041) 
R25 t-1 -0.010 0.048 0.051  0.063 0.031 0.030  -0.149 0.096 0.111 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.058)  (0.053) (0.050) (0.054)  (0.098) (0.077) (0.095) 
firstson - -0.007 
 
0.094 
 
 - -0.008 
 
0.186  - -0.007 
 
-0.005 
  (0.009) 
 
(0.096) 
 
  (0.010) 
 
(0.113)   (0.017) 
 
(0.262) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
District Covariates x x x  x x x  x x x 
District-Year Trend x x x  x x x  x x x 
Observations 3,248 8,367 8,367  2,323 5,448 5,448  925 2,919 2,919 
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.449 0.494 0.494  0.433 0.493 0.493  0.488 0.498 0.498 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: NFHS data. B.Ord refers to birth order. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All specifications also include birth year fixed effects, birth order 
fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and 
quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  rice yield, patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, 
and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-born son indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 – Son-Biased Fertility Stopping 
 
 Child Has a Younger Sibling 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
R50 t-1 * firstson -0.007 0.009 0.012  -0.011 0.003 0.008  0.011 0.020 0.019 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)  (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.118*** -0.114** -0.116**  -0.106** -0.104** -0.108**  -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.182** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)  (0.051) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.078) (0.082) (0.086) 
R50 t-1  -0.037 -0.048* -0.048  -0.024 -0.035 -0.038  -0.079* -0.087** -0.096* 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.032)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.039)  (0.04) (0.037) (0.051) 
R25 t-1  0.022 -0.001 -0.020  0.016 -0.008 -0.058  0.010 0.000 0.036 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.056)  (0.058) (0.062) (0.079)  (0.063) (0.06) (0.083) 
firstson -0.315 -0.223 -0.201  -0.436 -0.343 -0.347  0.108 0.150 0.205 
 (0.209) (0.192) (0.193)  (0.258) (0.251) (0.251)  (0.133) (0.119) (0.138) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
District Rice Productivity  x x   x x   x x 
District-Year Trend   x    x    x 
Observations 2,686 2,686 2,686  1,919 1,919 1,919  767 767 767 
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.839 0.839 0.839  0.808 0.808 0.808  0.952 0.952 0.952 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: NFHS data. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The sample in every column is children of  birth order 2 only. All specifications also include 
birth year fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear 
and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, and 
kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-born son indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Gender Differentiated Surviving Births 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Agricultural land -0.001 -0.001 - - -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 0.003 - - -0.000 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.005)   (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)   (0.001) (0.004) 
% Land registered -0.008*** -0.012*** 0.000 0.001 -0.011*** -0.016*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.026*** 0.054*** 0.007*** -0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Farm Productivity - -0.023** - -0.002 - -0.044*** - 0.024* - 0.029* - 0.023 
  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
             
Household FE x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Observations 44,590 7,869 19,548 3,627 25,042 4,242 44,590 7,869 19,548 3,627 25,042 4,242 
Households 2,286 1,928 1,144 892 1,142 1,036 2,286 1,928 1,144 892 1,142 1,036 
Years 1978-99 1982-95 1978-99 1982-95 1978-99 1982-95 1978-99 1982-95 1978-99 1982-95 1978-99 1982-95 
Notes: Primary survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land registered is computed as the sum over the previous three years 
of  the share of  land affected by each program over the total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include land ceiling and immigrant status indicators, 
and year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same way as % land registered. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, 
and regressions include data for years 1978–1999. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Surviving Male Births by Religion 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Religion: Hindu Non-Hindu 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land 0.001 - 0.001 -0.006 - -0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.004) 
% Land registered 0.010*** 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.223 0.317 0.152 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.145) (0.385) (0.212) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 35,018 15,549 19,469 9,572 3,999 5,573 
Households 1,822 934 888 464 210 254 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Primary survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land 
registered is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each program over the total 
cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include a land ceiling indicator, land ceiling and 
immigrant status indicators, and year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same way as % land 
registered. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, and regressions include data for 
years 1978–1999. Religion of  the household is the religion of  the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 11: Surviving Female Births by Religion 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
Religion: Hindu Non-Hindu 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land -0.000 - -0.000 -0.005*** - -0.005*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
% Land registered -0.009*** -0.001 -0.011*** 0.179 0.116 0.222 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.187) (0.266) (0.183) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 35,018 15,549 19,469 9,572 3,999 5,573 
Households 1,822 934 888 464 210 254 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Primary survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land 
registered is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each program over the total 
cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include a land ceiling indicator, land ceiling and 
immigrant status indicators, and year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same way as % land 
registered. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, and regressions include data for 
years 1978–1999. Religion of  the household is the religion of  the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Surviving Hindu Male Births by Immigrant Status 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Native/Immigrant: Native Immigrant 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land 0.001 - 0.001 -0.012 - -0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.010)  (0.009) 
% Land registered 0.008*** 0.011 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.564 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.481) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 29,099 10,471 18,628 5,919 5,078 841 
Households 1,340 491 849 482 443 39 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Primary survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The 
variable % land registered is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected 
by each program over the total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also 
include a land ceiling indicator, year of  immigration controls, and year and household fixed effects, and % land 
distributed calculated the same way as % land registered. The land category of  the household is defined based 
on year 1977 landholdings, and regressions include data for years 1978–1999. Religion of  the household is the 
religion of  the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 13: Surviving Hindu Female Births by Immigrant Status 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
Native/Immigrant: Native Immigrant 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land 0.000 - -0.000 -0.014 - -0.004 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.009)  (0.008) 
% Land registered -0.010*** -0.003 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.103 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.465) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 29,099 10,471 18,628 5,919 5,078 841 
Households 1,340 491 849 482 443 39 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Primary survey data. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The 
variable % land registered is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected 
by each program over the total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also 
include a land ceiling indicator, year of  immigration controls, and year and household fixed effects, and % land 
distributed calculated the same way as % land registered. The land category of  the household is defined based 
on year 1977 landholdings, and regressions include data for years 1978–1999. Religion of  the household is the 
religion of  the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A:  Additional Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1: Infant Mortality of First Borns and Probability of Second Birth 
 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 Infant Death Younger Sibling  Infant Death Younger Sibling  Infant Death Younger Sibling 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
          
R50 t-1 * female 0.014 0.007  0.011 0.026  0.025 -0.025 
 (0.025) (0.021)  (0.026) (0.032)  (0.042) (0.044) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.041 -0.005  -0.029 -0.003  -0.052 -0.022 
 (0.031) (0.017)  (0.037) (0.026)  (0.062) (0.039) 
R50 t-1 0.000 -0.015  0.017 -0.039  -0.033 0.038 
 (0.025) (0.030)  (0.028) (0.034)  (0.043) (0.04) 
R25 t-1 0.016 0.008  0.053 0.025  -0.057 -0.032 
 (0.048) (0.037)  (0.053) (0.052)  (0.055) (0.027) 
female -0.044 -0.245  -0.117 -0.286  0.169 -0.093 
 (0.12) (0.181)  (0.17) (0.268)  (0.288) (0.156) 
District FE x x  x x  x x 
District Covariates x x  x x  x x 
District-Year Trend x x  x x  x x 
Observations 3,248 3,248  2,323 2,323  925 925 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14  14 14  14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Specifications also include birth year fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, 
indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the 
mother’s age at which the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  for rice and cereal productivity, patta land area distributed, number of  
medical institutions, and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-born son 
indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2: Infant Mortality: Including Bihar Control Districts 
 
 Infant Death 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            R50 t-1 * firstson * female -0.058* -0.067* -0.067*  -0.077** -0.090** -0.089**  -0.023 -0.027 -0.030 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.040) (0.038)  (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) 
R25 t-1 * firstson * female 0.020 0.007 0.008  0.010 -0.009 -0.007  0.044 0.048 0.040 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)  (0.039) (0.046) (0.046)  (0.042) (0.05) (0.05) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.051** 0.051** 0.051**  0.066** 0.071** 0.071**  0.024 0.017 0.017 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.006 -0.009 -0.010  -0.002 0.000 -0.001  -0.030 -0.044 -0.041 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.033) (0.046) (0.047) 
R50 t-1 * firstson 0.027 0.031 0.031  0.020 0.030 0.030  0.041 0.035 0.035 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.025) (0.03) (0.03) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.024 -0.019 -0.017  -0.029 -0.012 -0.013  -0.005 -0.020 -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.028) (0.034) (0.032) 
R50 t-1 -0.043** -0.042** -0.061***  -0.035 -0.040* -0.054**  -0.068** -0.055 -0.082** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)  (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) 
R25 t-1  0.015 0.016 -0.009  -0.001 -0.004 -0.016  0.051 0.051 -0.003 
 (0.02) (0.021) (0.022)  (0.027) (0.025) (0.03)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) 
firstson * female -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  0.019 0.016 0.016  -0.052 -0.049 -0.044 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
female -0.023 -0.023 -0.023  -0.048* -0.047* -0.043  0.042 0.037 0.030 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) 
firstson 0.014 0.014 0.012  0.010 0.013 0.012  0.006 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.03) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
District Rice Productivity  x x   x x   x x 
District-Year Trend   x    x    x 
Observations 9,355 9,355 9,355  6,236 6,236 6,236  3,119 3,119 3,119 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 19 19 19  19 19 19  19 19 19 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children of  birth order 2 or higher. All specifications also include birth year fixed 
effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational 
attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. Specifications also include the district productivity controls and their 
corresponding interaction terms with the first-born son and female child indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3: Fertility: Including Bihar Control Districts 
 
 Child Has a Younger Sibling 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
R50 t-1 * firstson 0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000 0.004  0.004 -0.010 -0.015 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)  (0.049) (0.052) (0.051)  (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.094*** -0.096** -0.099**  -0.085** -0.083* -0.091**  -0.158** -0.183** -0.176** 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.045)  (0.037) (0.043) (0.044)  (0.065) (0.077) (0.078) 
R50 t-1 -0.036 -0.034 -0.040  -0.018 -0.017 -0.033  -0.085* -0.078* -0.070 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.039)  (0.049) (0.044) (0.043) 
R25 t-1  0.027 0.015 -0.019  0.032 0.019 -0.048  0.011 0.003 0.044 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.053)  (0.045) (0.052) (0.076)  (0.042) (0.037) (0.065) 
firstson -0.008 -0.008 -0.003  -0.029 -0.029 -0.023  0.081** 0.076* 0.065 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.02)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.042) (0.047) 
District FE x x x  x x x  x x x 
District Rice Productivity  x x   x x   x x 
District-Year Trend   x    x    x 
Observations 2,935 2,935 2,935  2,126 2,126 2,126  809 809 809 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The sample in each specification is children of  birth order 2. All specifications also include birth year fixed 
effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic 
terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. Specifications also include the district productivity controls and their corresponding interaction terms with the first-
born son.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.4: Infant Mortality: Mother Fixed Effects 
 
 Infant Death 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
R50 t-1 * firstson * female -0.085**  -0.084  -0.074 
 (0.038)  (0.050)  (0.057) 
R25 t-1 * firstson * female 0.020  0.010  0.056 
 (0.03)  (0.045)  (0.058) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.039**  0.051*  0.007 
 (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.043) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.023  -0.038  -0.012 
 (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.04) 
R50 t-1 * firstson 0.047  0.064*  -0.001 
 (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.041) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.022  -0.017  -0.059* 
 (0.015)  (0.03)  (0.034) 
R50 t-1 -0.050***  -0.060**  -0.021 
 (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
R25 t-1  0.007  0.013  0.017 
 (0.021)  (0.035)  (0.032) 
firstson * female 0.004  -0.009  -0.080 
 (0.049)  (0.076)  (0.086) 
female 0.019  0.026  0.072 
 (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.069) 
Mother FE x  x  x 
District Covariates x  x  x 
District-Year Trend x  x  x 
Observations 8,367  5,448  2,919 
Cohorts 1978-91  1978-91  1978-91 
Districts 14  14  14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children of  birth order 
2 or higher. All specifications also include birth year fixed effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview 
fixed effects, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is born. The district 
covariates include logs of  rice and cereal productivity, patta land area distributed, number of  medical 
institutions, and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the 
female child and the first-born son indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5: Infant Mortality: Showing Covariates including Rice Productivity 
 
 Infant Death 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1  B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1  B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
R50 t-1 * firstson * female - -0.073*  - -0.097**  - -0.028 
  (0.039)   (0.048)   (0.055) 
R25 t-1 * firstson * female - 0.031  - 0.019  - 0.046 
  (0.038)   (0.051)   (0.044) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.014 0.046**  0.011 0.070**  0.025 -0.001 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.026) (0.029)  (0.042) (0.046) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.041 -0.029  -0.029 -0.027  -0.052 -0.036 
 (0.031) (0.032)  (0.037) (0.033)  (0.062) (0.048) 
R50 t-1 * firstson - 0.039  - 0.043  - 0.029 
  (0.028)   (0.032)   (0.031) 
R25 t-1 * firstson - -0.034  - -0.035  - -0.016 
  (0.023)   (0.036)   (0.03) 
R50 t-1 0.000 -0.063***  0.017 -0.059**  -0.033 -0.078** 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.028) (0.026)  (0.043) (0.035) 
R25 t-1  0.016 0.001  0.053 -0.003  -0.057 -0.005 
 (0.048) (0.020)  (0.053) (0.031)  (0.055) (0.039) 
ln rice yield t-1 * firstson * female - 0.043  - 0.087  - 0.087 
  (0.049)   (0.068)   (0.068) 
ln rice yield t-1 * female -0.058 0.035  -0.020 -0.009  -0.170* -0.009 
 (0.042) (0.044)  (0.049) (0.053)  (0.093) (0.053) 
ln rice yield t-1 * firstson - -0.041  - -0.109  - -0.109 
  (0.048)   (0.065)   (0.065) 
ln rice yield t-1 0.085* -0.102**  0.062 0.006  0.206** -0.308*** 
 (0.046) (0.046)  (0.053) (0.048)  (0.09) (0.121) 
firstson * female - -0.025 
 
 - -0.096 
 
 - 0.085 
  (0.141) 
 
  (0.177) 
 
  (0.219) 
female -0.044 0.163 
 
 -0.117 0.171 
 
 0.169 0.174 
 (0.12) (0.131) 
 
 (0.170) (0.131) 
 
 (0.288) (0.247) 
firstson - 0.034 
 
 - 0.061 
 
 - -0.017 
  (0.137) 
 
  (0.197) 
 
  (0.150) 
District FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
District Covariates x x  x x  x x 
District-Year Trend x x  x x  x x 
Observations 3,248 8,367  2,323 5,448  925 2,919 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14  14 14  14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All specifications also include birth year fixed 
effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether 
the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which 
the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, 
and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-
born son indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6: Sex Ratios: Showing Covariates including Rice Productivity 
 
 Child is Male 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1  B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1  B. Or. 1 B. Or. >1 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
R50 t-1 * firstson - -0.011  - -0.014  - 0.004 
  (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.047) 
R25 t-1 * firstson - -0.005  - 0.005  - -0.033 
  (0.027)   (0.031)   (0.062) 
R50 t-1 -0.020 0.045*  -0.065 0.055**  0.091 0.039 
 (0.037) (0.025)  (0.050) (0.029)  (0.064) (0.041) 
R25 t-1 -0.010 0.051  0.063 0.030  -0.149 0.111 
 (0.034) (0.058)  (0.053) (0.054)  (0.098) (0.095) 
ln rice yield t-1 * firstson - -0.014  - -0.034  - -0.010 
  (0.029)   (0.039)   (0.084) 
ln rice yield t-1 -0.064 -0.009  -0.010 0.023  -0.241* -0.062 
 (0.098) (0.051)  (0.131) (0.050)  (0.136) (0.098) 
firstson - 0.094 
 
 - 0.186  - -0.005 
  (0.096) 
 
  (0.113)   (0.262) 
District FE x x  x x  x x 
District Covariates x x  x x  x x 
District-Year Trend x x  x x  x x 
Observations 3,248 8,367  2,323 5,448  925 2,919 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14  14 14  14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All specifications also include birth year fixed effects, 
birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the 
household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the 
child is born. The district covariates include logs of  patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, and 
kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-born son 
indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.7: Fertility : Showing Covariates including Rice Productivity 
 
 Child has a Younger Sibling 
 All Children  Hindu Children  Non-Hindu Children 
 B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. 2  B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. 2  B. Ord. 1 B. Ord. 2 
  (1) (2)  (4) (5)  (7) (8) 
          
R50 t-1 * firstson - 0.012  - 0.008  - 0.019 
  (0.044)   (0.051)   (0.05) 
R25 t-1 * firstson - -0.116**  - -0.108**  - -0.182** 
  (0.055)   (0.052)   (0.086) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.007 -  0.026 -  -0.025 - 
 (0.021)   (0.032)   (0.044)  
R25 t-1 * female -0.005 -  -0.003 -  -0.022 - 
 (0.017)   (0.026)   (0.039)  
R50 t-1 -0.015 -0.048  -0.039 -0.038  0.038 -0.096* 
 (0.030) (0.032)  (0.034) (0.039)  (0.04) (0.051) 
R25 t-1  0.008 -0.020  0.025 -0.058  -0.032 0.036 
 (0.037) (0.056)  (0.052) (0.079)  (0.027) (0.083) 
ln rice yield t-1 * firstson - -0.086  - -0.083  - -0.050 
  (0.072)   (0.085)   (0.052) 
ln rice yield t-1 * female 0.026 -  0.036 -  0.001 - 
 (0.038)   (0.045)   (0.067)  
ln rice yield t-1 -0.030 -0.061  -0.051 -0.047  0.090 -0.093 
 (0.066) (0.075)  (0.081) (0.09)  (0.103) (0.086) 
female -0.245 -  -0.286 -  -0.093 - 
 
(0.181)   (0.268)   (0.156)  
firstson - -0.201  - -0.347  - 0.205 
  (0.193)   (0.251)   (0.138) 
District FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
District Covariates x x  x x  x x 
District-Year Trend x x  x x  x x 
Observations 3,248 2,686  2,323 1,919  925 767 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14  14 14  14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Specifications also include birth year fixed 
effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is 
rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which the child is 
born. The district covariates include logs of  patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, and 
kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-
born son indicators.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8: Infant Mortality by Birth Order 
 
 Infant Death 
 Birth Order 2  Birth Order >2 
 All Hindu Non-Hindu  All Hindu Non-Hindu 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        R50 t-1 * firstson * female -0.029 -0.068 -0.025  -0.091** -0.110** -0.032 
 (0.05) (0.063) (0.115)  (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) 
R25 t-1 * firstson * female -0.03 0.006 -0.125  0.056 0.018 0.103* 
 (0.064) (0.087) (0.120)  (0.043) (0.050) (0.057) 
R50 t-1 * female 0.007 0.030 0.007  0.060** 0.089*** 0.000 
 (0.031) (0.046) (0.082)  (0.024) (0.03) (0.044) 
R25 t-1 * female -0.024 -0.034 0.006  -0.032 -0.022 -0.056 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.058)  (0.032) (0.037) (0.058) 
R50 t-1 * firstson 0.037 0.064 0.011  0.037 0.028 0.038 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.035)  (0.029) (0.032) (0.038) 
R25 t-1 * firstson -0.059 -0.115* 0.106  -0.023 0.006 -0.058** 
 (0.042) (0.065) (0.076)  (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) 
R50 t-1 -0.058 -0.042 -0.119  -0.061*** -0.066** -0.056* 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.068)  (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) 
R25 t-1  0.032 0.045 -0.040  -0.009 -0.029 0.025 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.061)  (0.026) (0.036) (0.043) 
firstson * female 0.021 -0.278 0.963  -0.010 0.055 -0.231 
 (0.22) (0.270) (0.535)  (0.168) (0.232) (0.371) 
female -0.222 0.005 -0.778  0.320 0.237 0.553 
 (0.165) (0.171) (0.399)  (0.195) (0.165) (0.427) 
firstson 0.019 0.107 -0.207  0.008 -0.028 0.094 
 (0.213) (0.362) (0.295)  (0.106) (0.150) (0.146) 
District FE x x x  x x x 
District Covariates x x x  x x x 
District-Year Trend x x x  x x x 
Observations 2,686 1,919 767  5,681 3,529 2,152 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All specifications also include the birth year fixed 
effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether 
the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s age at which 
the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  patta land area distributed, number of  medical institutions, 
and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the female child and the first-
born son indicators. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.9: Sex Ratio at Birth: by Birth Order 
 
 Child is Male 
 Birth Order 2  Birth Order >2 
 All Hindu Non-Hindu  All Hindu Non-Hindu 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        R50 t-1 * firstson 0.000 -0.018 0.025  -0.021 -0.024 0.004 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.109)  (0.033) (0.037) (0.044) 
R25 t-1 * firstson 0.032 0.043 -0.046  -0.017 -0.010 -0.027 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.128)  (0.038) (0.032) (0.078) 
R50 t-1 0.055 0.135*** -0.131  0.044 0.022 0.100 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.135)  (0.032) (0.031) (0.064) 
R25 t-1  0.039 0.061 0.033  0.060 0.019 0.159 
 (0.054) (0.065) (0.129)  (0.07) (0.071) (0.117) 
firstson -0.063 -0.038 -0.018  0.167 0.280 0.014 
 (0.209) (0.357) (0.395)  (0.194) (0.186) (0.284) 
District FE x x x  x x x 
District Covariates x x x  x x x 
District-Year Trend x x x  x x x 
Observations 2,686 1,919 767  5,681 3,529 2,152 
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91  1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 
Districts 14 14 14  14 14 14 
Notes: Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All specifications also include birth year fixed 
effects, birth order fixed effects, year of  interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, 
whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of  the mother’s 
age at which the child is born. The district covariates include logs of  rice and cereal productivity, patta land area 
distributed, number of  medical institutions, and kilometres of  surfaced road per capita and their corresponding 
interactions with the female child and the first-born son indicators. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.10: Gender Differentiated Surviving Births: Interaction with First-born Gender 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land -0.001 - -0.001 -0.000 - -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Land registered -0.009*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.005**
* 
0.014*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
firstson * % Land registered 0.003 -0.038 0.007*** 0.011* 0.656*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.117) (0.002) (0.006) (0.218) (0.003) 
firstson 0.037*** 0.025**
* 
0.044*** -
0.110**
* 
-0.120*** -0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.0 4) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 44,590 19,548 25,042 44,590 19,548 25,042 
Households 2,286 1,144 1,142 2,286 1,144 1,142 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land registered is 
computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each program over the total cultivable 
land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include land ceiling and immigrant status indicators, and 
year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same way as % land registered, and its interaction 
with the first-born son indicator. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, and 
regressions include data for years 1978–1999. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.11: Gender-Differentiated Surviving Births – Adding District-Year Fixed Effects 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land -0.001 - -0.001 -0.000 - -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Land registered -0.007*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
District-Year FE x x x x x x 
Observations 42,304 18,404 23,900 42,304 18,404 23,900 
Households 2,268 1,126 1,142 2,268 1,126 1,142 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land registered 
is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each program over the 
total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include a land ceiling indicator, 
immigrant status indicators, and year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same way 
as % land registered. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, and 
regressions include data for years 1978–1999. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A.12: Gender-Differentiated Surviving Births – Full Sample 
 
Dep. Variable: 
1=surviving girl, 
0=no birth or surviving boy 
1=surviving boy, 
0=no birth or surviving girl 
Land category: All Landless Some land All Landless Some land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Agricultural land -0.001 - -0.001 -0.000 - 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Land registered -0.009*** -0.003 -0.010*** 0.009*** 0.042*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) 
       
Household FE x x x x x x 
Observations 56,461 23,154 33,307 56,461 23,154 33,307 
Households 2,286 1,230 1,403 2,286 1,230 1,403 
Years 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 1978-99 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The variable % land registered 
is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each program over the 
total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All regressions also include a land ceiling indicator, 
immigrant status indicators, and year and household fixed effects, and % land distributed calculated the same 
way as % land registered. The land category of  the household is defined based on year 1977 landholdings, and 
regressions include data for years 1978–1999. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.13: Hours of  Family Farm Labour Supplied by Males vs Females 
 
Dep. Variable: 
Difference in Logarithms of Male and Female 
Hours of Labour 
Land category: Family Hired Family + Hired 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    % Land registered -0.029 0.052 -0.004 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.035) 
    
Household FE x x x 
Observations 2,595 2,595 2,595 
Households 656 656 656 
Years 1981-96 1981-96 1981-96 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. The 
variable % The outcome variable is defined as the log of  (1+hours worked). Land registered 
is computed as the sum over the previous three years of  the share of  land affected by each 
program over the total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. All 
regressions also include year and household fixed effects, area of  the farm worked by the 
household, and % land distributed calculated the same way as % land registered. 
Regressions include data for years 1981–1996. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
